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Lady of the Common Law has indeed no lack of wooers.

Three years ago the word went forth that there was to be opened
a new shrine to be devoted to her cult. She would not show her face to
any who failed to prove their worth. She would not be won by amorous
glances or soulful prayers or threats or sighs or groans. Comely looks
would be lost upon her, and so would riches and birth and all the accidents of fortune. Nothing would avail except service in her cause, service not for a day or a month, but for three long years of vigil and
devotion. Behold a marvel happened! Hardly had the word gone forth
before a band of worshippers had gathered. They were eight hundred
strong the first year. With each succeeding year, the volume swelled.
Now the triennial term has ended; and here in this hall, the faithful
have been brought together to claim the guerdon of their toil, the privilege of enrollment among our Lady's well beloved, the servants of her
law.
I speak of it as a service not ended, but persisting. If you have
fancied it was ended, you have been a victim of the Lady's wiles. Like
other flirts and beauties, she can speak with a double meaning, and is
not above playing a sly trick on those whose sighs and service are
offered at her feet. I give you warning now lest you become dupes of
her caprice. Do not think for a moment that the three years of devotion
that have been given for the bare and meagre privilege of being numbered on her roll,-do not think that these exhaust the measure of
your sacrifice. What has been endured is merely a novitiate, a term of
test and trial, a period of probation in which slackers may fall aside,
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and the strong and brave and earnest be
left within the ranks. The truth is that our
Lady is growing more exacting with the
years. When I was placed upon her roll
these many years ago, she was content with
very little. The barest rudiments of law
sufficed to give to the acolyte of those days
the privilege to kiss the hem of her flowing
and unspotted robe. But it is otherwise in
this year of grace. Our Lady of the Common Law-I say it with the humility that
is due from an old and faithful servantour Lady in these days is no longer an
easy one to please. She has become insatiate in her demands. Not law alone, but
almost every branch of human knowledge,
has been brought within her ken, and so
within the range of sacrifice exacted of her
votaries. Those who would earn her best
rewards must make their knowledge as
deep as the science and as broad and universal as the culture of their day. She will
not be satisfied with less.
I was reading the other day a very interesting document, the report for the academic year of 1926-27 made to the
Overseers of Harvard University by the
President of the University, Dr. A. Lawrence Lowell. He speaks of a new educational concept, the concept, as he calls it,
of the continuity of knowledge. The idea is
taking root that the subdivisions of education like those of time itself have been
treated too often as absolute and genuine,
-that there is need to recognize them
more fully as mere figments of the brain,
mere labor-saving devices, helps to thinking, but, like other helps to thinking, misleading if their origin is neglected or forgotten. Thus it is that the physicist is
learning from the chemist, the zoologist

from the botanist, the economist from the
statesman and the student of social science,
the physician from the psychologist, and
so on interchangeably and indefinitely.
"The sharp severance," we are told, "is
giving way, and we perceive that all subjects pass imperceptibly into others previously distinct." Something of this same
concept of the continuity of knowledge is
making its way into the law. In my own
court at a recent session, we had one case
where a wise decision called for the wisdom of a chemist; another for that of one
skilled in the science of mechanics; another
for that of the student of biology and medicine, and so on through the list. I do not
say we were able to supply this fund of
wisdom out of the resources of our knowledge, yet, in theory at least, the litigants
before us were entitled to expect it, and
our efficiency as judges would be so much
the greater, the quality of the output so
much the sounder and richer, in proportion
to our ability to make the theory one with
fact. Of course, complete knowledge of the
body of organized learning is an unrealized
achievement. So vain an aspiration is not
to fret our waking hours. We cannot sound
the depths; there will be strain enough
upon our energies if we do so much as
skim the surface. Even to do this, however,
there is need for an equipment of learning
fuller by far and richer than any that was
exacted of the bar of simpler days. Few
of us can hope to solve for ourselves the
problems that perplex the historian or the
economist or the physican or the chemist.
We shall have to look to the expert for a
definitive answer to the queries that are
proper to his chosen field. The point is,
however, that without a full and rich background of knowledge and culture in fields
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foreign to the law itself, we shall never
reach the perception of the problems to be
solved. We shall never see it in its true relation to the lives of those about us, and
missing its relation to life, we shall miss
its relation to the law, which is to give the
rule of life. One must know the method of
approach if one would hope to gain the
goal. The concept of the continuity of
knowledge is teaching us day by day the
need for an enriched equipment, and is
pointing the path to be followed by the
lawyer of tomorrow.
Let me not seem to stress the element
of knowledge to the exclusion of all else.
Knowledge is indeed an important part of
our equipment, yet knowledge is not the
whole. At an hour like this, the fitting
thing perhaps is to lay the weight of emphasis on other strains and elements that
unite to form the blend. I was told when
I was asked to talk to you today that this
was to be a sort of uplift meeting to bring
home to us all, and, in particular to the
fledglings of the bar,-to bring home in a
vivid way the dignity and glory of the profession of the law, its capacites realized
and unrealized for service to mankind. I
gathered that somehow or other it was my
duty to talk at such a time, however great
my dread of speeches, and my resistance
was broken down by the covert suggestion
that if I failed to talk today-however
silent I might be through the other day3 of
the year-if I failed to talk today, I should
be recusant to the great trust that has been
laid upon me as the titular chief-though
chief in no other way-of the judicial system of the state.
So I come before you here charged with
a duty to rehearse the ancient platitudes.
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I do not mean by that epithet to cheapen
or deride them. We are wont to call things
platitudes when we know them to be truths,
but have a disagreeable sense that we have
failed to live up to them altogether in the
conduct of our lives. Perhaps it will be
easier, if only we call them platitudes, to
silence or forget them. We have a nameless
feeling of irritation and discomfort, as if
there were a challenge to our virtue, when
they are ding-donged in our ears with provocative iteration. Not for me today are
these hesitations and misgivings. Today I
am commissioned to be as stale and unoriginal as I please, and to count the yawns
of my audience as proof of duty done.
So, of course, they often are. The bores
of the hour have often been the heroes of
the future. Socrates was voted by the
Athenians to be a horrid old bore who deserved nothing better than his hemlock.
He has been rewarded for his boredom by
an immortality which even we may miss.
Boswell was a bore who was snubbed for
his pains by the man he was exalting. He
has had his reward in winning immortality
for himself and incidentally perhaps for
the snubber too. I suppose judges, or
nearly all of them, are bores. Outside of
the pages of Judge Holmes, who is in a
class by himself, I am not aware that men
resort to the opinions of the courts as a
spiritual elixir in hours of depression. So
I console myself with the thought that if
I preach sterile truths, I shall be playing
true to form.
I suppose the traditional thing to say to
the young men of the bar with the future
yet before them is that what counts above
all else is character. That is a tiresome
thing to say because it has been said so
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often, and I wouldn't say it now if I hadn't
received a license to make myself a bore.
With this license accorded to me, I feel I
must say it because it happens to be true.
Character includes many things, industry
and fidelity as well as conscience and
honor. At the one end of the scale are the
Poor Richard maxims of frugality and diligence and at the other the sacrifice and devotion and idealism of saints and heroes.
Those who fancy that success comes by
chance might learn something from the life
of Lord Cairns, who became Lord Chancellor of England, and one of the most
famous of English judges. His biographer
records the fact that when Cairns was
called to the bar, he set himself to practice
with all his solemn earnestness. "No reason or excuse did he allow himself to leave
the precincts of the law while a barrister
might be expected to remain there." It was
this circumstance, we are told, that gave
him an early start. Let the week-end golfers of our day take heed! "He had declined
an invitation for a Saturday, though he had
no work to do, and was sitting in his chambers close on four in the afternoon when
the unexpected happened." An eminent
advocate, Mr. Gregory of Bedford Row,
had a sudden occasion to consult counsel.
He tried many chambers only to find them
closed. "At last," says the biographer, "he
came to the address where Cairns was
keeping his lonely vigil and found, not
merely a barrister, but the barrister for
whom solicitors are looking-a young man
of ripe learning and sound judgment. From
that day Mr. Gregory's firm were constant
clients." Here is a good instance of the rewards that come to the faithful and steady
practice of those qualities of sobriety and
diligence which I placed at the lower end

of the scale of virtues appropriate to beginners at the bar. But there are shining
instances too of rewards, more splendid
even and enduring, that attend the practice of other virtues, the virtues at the upper end of this great chromatic scale. Think
of the glory that is still shed upon our judicial history by the example of Lord
Mansfield, and the fame of his unyielding
honor. I like to retell the tale, so often told
before, of his conduct during the antipapist riots of 1780. The mob, instigated
by Lord George Gordon, destroyed his
house, looted its contents, and ruined his
law library, the law books which he had
annotated with jealous care. Such was his
reputation for judicial impartiality that the
leader of the mob elected to be tried before
him, and not before some other judge.
When it was over, there was no challenge,
even from the prisoner, of the fairness of
the trial. Character had triumphed over
prejudice and passion.
I take comfort in memories like these
when I am told, as I often am, that lawyers
and judges are brakes, and old-fashioned
ones at that upon the forward movement
of the race. I was reading not long ago,it happened to be New Year's Eve, when
I was preparing the usual stock of resolutions for the future-I was reading an indictment of the legal mind in the days of
Voltaire, which expanded itself into one
of the legal mind generally. "Reverence,"
said the author, "for precedent, attachment to the letter of the law, the effort to
bend changed ways of life to obsolete statutes, habits of chop-logic, pedantry and
cynicism masquerading as austerity, habitual distrust of human nature and of generous impulses, professional vanity, all
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these render members of the legal profession liable to fanatical reaction, to frigid
cruelty, to oppressive injustice in an often
honest passion for social order."
This was salutary reading for New
Year's Eve, if a penitential state of mind
might be expected to yield a fair crop of
goodly resolutions for the year about to
start. Sobering as the indictment was, I
found another book more chastening, more
provocative of thought and introspection
and humility. You will find a series of
essays, gathered together under the title
Historical Trials, the work of the late Sir
John MacDonnell, who in his life was
King's Remembrancer and senior Master
of the Supreme Court of Judicature. His
theme is one that is never stale, the correspondence between law and justice, the
extent to which courts do in very truth fulfill the function of their being, and this not
in fair weather, but in foul, in times of
stress and strain, when the legal mechanism should hold good against passion and
prejudice and cruelty, and show what it
can do. I admit that the record is not a
soil for smooth and joyous gratulation. It
is a challenge to one and all of us. Remember, if you please, that the author is
no muckraker, but a skilled and scholarly
lawyer, and himself a cog in the law machine of a progressive and enlightened
country. Here gathered together in a slender volume are the trials of Socrates, the
Knights Templars, Jeanne d'Arc, Giordano
Bruno, Mary Queen of Scots, Galileo, Servetus, Katharine of Aragon, Sir Walter
Raleigh, the witchcraft trials and others.
"A trial," says our author, "a trial is in
substance a struggle, a battle in a closed
arena. It is a shock of contending forces,
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a contest which may arouse the fiercest
passions. The issues involved in the trial,
say of Socrates, of Jeanne d'Arc, of Bruno,
or Calas, or Dreyfus, are among the deepest and greatest known to humanity. I
would not, even if I could, deal with them.
They are above my task. They are for the
philosopher, the historian, the moralist. I
approach these trials," he continues,
"solely as a lawyer examining the documents as a lawyer; trying to find answers
to questions which a lawyer must put,
necessarily passing over many of the greatest aspects of such trials, but also perhaps
adverting to some apt to be ignored. I
want to look at these cases just as if they
were about to come into court, or had
just been decided; to view them as legal
phenomena, part of the legal history of
men, not the least part of the long story of
the evolution of the human conscience."
Take the first trial that he gives us, the
trial of Socrates: will its lessons ever fade?
"I come to the questions," says Sir John,
"which twenty centuries have reiterated
and which are still fresh. Was it a fair trial?
Was Socrates guilty? Was the defense a
long sophism? Did he corrupt the youth?
Was the result a judicial error or a judicial murder? I do not believe that to
these questions there ever will be one answer. There will always be those who prize
order, the interests of the community,
above all else; who make the safety of the
State the supreme law and they will answer,
as did Hegel, as many others have done
since, 'It was a good deed, a necessary
deed; Socrates must die that the people
might live and be strong.' That was the
opinion of the majority of his fellow citizens; and there is no reason to believe that
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they repented, at all events until long afterwards. * * * If the prosecution and condemnation of Socrates were acts of State,
they were at least done decently and in
order, and with no desire to stifle the voice
of the victim, and there are none of the
circumstances of brutality which I shall
often have to note in medieval and modern
trials. That is one view of the trial still
often expressed. But there will always be
others who, prizing individual freedom and
the inner life above all things, thinking
much of the invisible and imponderable
things about us, will regard the result as a
crime, the victim as the first and greatest
martyr for true freedom and true progress.
In the presence of these antinomics among
the irreconcilable things of life, the mere
lawyer cannot give much assistance. But
he will try to put himself in the position of
the judges, and seek to understand the law
which they administered; he will apply to
their conduct the tests, not of our time, but
of their own. And he will also put to himself the question: would the results have
differed if Socrates had been tried elsewhere and at some other time?"
Sir John's answer to the question is not
one to kindle the pride of our profession.
Socrates put on trial elsewhere and at some
other time might have fared, in Sir John's
judgment, no better, perhaps worse. Later
days would have brought torture, and still
later days contempt and ostracism and
misunderstanding and belittlement. The indictment would have been cast in other
moulds and the penalty would have been
less than death; but law would still have
been used to sanctify the prejudices and
hatreds of the hour, and to crush the weakling who resists them. With impressive

force our author sums up the lesson to be
drawn from his studies; and the lesson is
one of the corroding power of fear-fear
of the unknown and the strange and the
prejudice that goes with fear. "Fear," he
says, "brings back the primitive conception
of the function of courts; not necessarily,
or indeed often, personal fear, but fear of
changes; fear on the part of the upholders
of the old order; fear of the effects of the
discoveries of new truths; fear of emerging
into the full light. Where such fear is, justice cannot be; a court becomes an instrument of power; judges are soldiers putting
down rebellion; a so-called trial is a punitive expedition or a ceremonial execution
-its victim a Bruno, a Galileo, or a Dreyfus."
I do not know whether it can ever be
different, or so at least I say in hours of
depression. Perhaps this is what law means.
It is the medium, the instrument, by which
society represses conduct which awakens
fear of such intensity as to make tolerance
impossible. We shall rationalize law only
when we rationalize our fears-our fears
and our wishes, the counterpart of our
fears. I heard a distinguished physician say
the other day that psychologists were coming over to the view that the fruitful
method of education is not so much to
control the behavior of men as to direct
their desires-their impulses and desires.
He put it in such a way as to challenge
my interest and attention, but the thought
is now becoming a commonplace of the
schools. There is a lesson in all this for
the law and for those who follow the law
as judges and as advocates. In directing desires-in rationalizing hopes and fearsin shaping and guiding character, we shall
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be doing something more, we shall be
rationalizing law.
So the problem, as I said at the beginning, is one of character, which turns out
in the end to be the key to behavior and so
to social order. How does it stand with us
today, with us of the legal profession, with
us whose business it is to see that law is
rational? How have we fulfilled our task?
Has fear, unworthy fear, been cast out of
our juristic methods? Is law the instrument
of the passion or the guile or the craftiness
of the hour, or of its serenity and peace
and order? Has it been purged and sanctified and dignified so that Socrates and
Raleigh and the witches,-the ugly, the
alien, the unpopular, the bothersomewould fare better at its hands today? It is
what you and I are making it. That is the
heavy burden of our calling, but that is
also its unfading glory. That is the strain
and the woe of it, leaving creases and scars
in the faces of the veterans, but that is also
the heartening appeal of it, reflecting light
and joy and hope in the faces of the new
recruits, eager to join the fray and fill the
thinning ranks. Here is the age-long battle,
worthy of the best that we or they can
offer. Here is the combat and the travail,
but beyond are the sunlit hills to be gained
at any cost of blood and sweat and agony.
For "the path of the just is as the shining
light, that shineth more and more unto the
perfect day."
Sometimes secreted in ancient forms and
ceremonies one finds the inner life and
meaning of an institution revealed in all
its essence. I felt this not long ago while
reading the form of oath administered even
now in all its ancient beauty to the grand
jurors of the county. You will find it in
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the Code of Criminal Procedure; but one
not greatly different is in use by our English
brethren in their home across the seas, and
Sir Frederick Pollock has traced it back,
in germ at least, to the days of the Saxon
kings. In fitness and beauty and impressiveness it rivals the famous Hippocratic oath,
the glory and the pride of our brethren, the
physicians. Here is its form as it has endured through all the changing centuries:
You shall diligently inquire and true
presentment make, of all such matters and
things as shall be given you in charge; the
counsel of the people of this state, your
fellows' and your own, you shall keep secret; you shall present no person from envy,
hatred or malice; nor shall you leave any
one unpresented through fear, favor, affection or reward, or hope thereof; but you
shall present all things truly as they come
to your knowledge, according to the best
of your understanding. So help you God!
Like the tones of a mighty bell, these
echoing notes of adjuration bring back our
straying thoughts to sanctity and service.
I cannot listen to them without a thrill.
Here, I say to myself, here indeed, secreted
in this solemn formula, is the true spirit of
the law, which knows no fear nor favor.
Not all her ministers have been true to the
ideal which she has held aloft for them to
follow. But here, imperishably preserved
amid the grime and dust of centuries, the
word has been proclaimed, to steady us
when we seem to falter, to strengthen us
when we seem to weaken, to tell us that
with all the failings and backslidings, with
all the fears and all the prejudice, the
spirit is still pure.
So today, as preacher of the ancient
platitudes, I summon you, the new recruits,
to do your part in this unending struggle,
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the charge on the redoubts of fear and
hatred and prejudice and passion, and the
injustice that is born of them. You will
need to know much more than the pifflepaffle of procedure. You will need to know
much more than law, or rather till you
know many other things not often ranked
as law, you will find that law itself is in
reality unknown. As in any other fight, you
will hear the call for patience and skill and
courage and firmness and endurance. I
have faith you will not fail us. As I look
into your faces, I figure to myself what it
will mean, in days to come, to the profession of the law if you and those to follow
you out of this school will think worthily
and highly of this great vocation of your
choice. What a spiritual power you will
then be in the age-old fellowship into
which you are to enter! What a leavening
force you will become in this great conglomerate bar of ours, moved as it is, at
times, by the ferment of high thoughts and
fine ideals, and yet at times in danger of

becoming sodden and inert by reason of
that very mass which might make it so
irresistible a power for good! How it lies
with you to uplift what is low, to erase
what is false, to redeem what has been
lost, till all the world shall see, and seeing
shall understand, that union of the scholar's
thought, the mystic's yearning, the knight's
ardor, and the hero's passion, which is still,
in truest moments of self-expression, the
spirit of the bar! You will not fail us, I am
sure. After all, the main thing is to dare.
"As at the Olympic games," says Aristotle,
"it is not the finest and strongest men who
are crowned, but they who enter the lists,
for out of these the prizemen are selected;
so, too, in life, of the honorable and the
good, it is they who act who rightly win the
prizes." The bugle call is heard, and its
echoes wake the hills.
Like Socrates and other bores, I have
earned the draft of hemlock if you choose
to pass the cup.

